The return, the terms, and the threshold.
Four things in order: what the replay is actually worth as an annual number, what 2 and 20 takes out of it, what that compounds to over five to twenty years, and what would have to happen before outside capital is accepted. The last section takes a non-binding indication of interest. No money moves anywhere on this page.
Three ways to state the same 12.8 months.
The replay is real work and a real result. The percentage depends entirely on what you divide it by, and two of the three denominators below are flattering for the wrong reason.
| Denominator | Return over 12.8 months | Annualized | Use it? |
|---|---|---|---|
| Account equity — $18,000 | 527.9% | ~460% | No. One contract per book cannot absorb $18,000 of return; this measures sizing, not skill. |
| Premium at risk — $14,101 floor | 674.0% | ~580% | No. The floor is a survival number, not invested capital. |
| Notional — ~$370,000 at 100 shares per book | ~29% | ~29% | Yes. This is the rate the strategy earns against the exposure it actually carries. |
At one contract per signal the desk earns the same dollars whether the account holds $18,000 or $180,000. The replay rate is therefore a statement about contract size, not about capital efficiency. Adding money to a one-contract desk does not add profit — it only lowers the percentage. Compounding 41% a month for twenty years produces a number with more digits than the options market has contracts, which is the arithmetic equivalent of a red flag.
The number that does scale
The edge survives when it is expressed against notional instead of equity. Run the identical signals on 100 shares per book and the desk earns $8,983 a month on roughly $370,000 — about 29% a year, with no leverage, no greeks and no fill assumption beyond the underlying's own liquidity.
That is the number the projections below use as their top case, and it is the only one of the three that a reasonable reader should accept at face value.
Arithmetic on the replay: $95,038 net over 12.8 months, 9,251 replayed trades, one contract per signal, after Tradier Pro's full bill. Annualized figures are geometric, not simple, and are shown only to demonstrate why they should be discarded. The ~$370,000 notional figure is the doc's share-equivalent comparison, not a second backtest.
2 and 20, priced out.
The standard private-fund terms are 2% of assets a year and 20% of the gain. On a single year of $100,000 with no additions, the management fee comes off the top and the performance fee is charged on what is left — which is why the drag is larger than the sum of the two headline numbers.
| Gross year | 2% mgmt | 20% of gain | Net to investor |
|---|---|---|---|
| Conservative — 12% | $2,000 | $2,000 | 7.8% |
| Base — 20% | $2,000 | $3,600 | 14.1% |
| Replay-equivalent — 29% | $2,000 | $5,400 | 21.2% |
About six points, every year
At a 20% gross year the investor keeps 14.1%. The fee is not 22% of the return in theory — it is 29.5% in practice, because the performance fee is charged on the gain after the management fee has already been taken. Over twenty years the $526,144 charged removes about $1.9 million of terminal value — the fee is capital that never compounds.
2% charged monthly on the balance. 20% charged once a year on that year's net gain after the management fee, and only in a year that ends higher than it started plus contributions — no fee on money the investor put in, no catch-up charged on a losing year. No hurdle rate, no high-water-mark clawback, no placement fee. Tax is not modelled; for a taxable investor the after-tax figure is lower.
What $100,000 becomes.
Set the opening amount, a monthly addition and a horizon. The model charges 2 and 20 exactly as described above, compounds monthly and adds contributions at the end of each month. Every figure below is hypothetical.
The base case is a full point below the replay-equivalent rate, and the replay is a hypothetical result from 12.8 months of one volatility regime. A reader who trusts none of it should use 12%.
| If the case holds | Invested | Gross value | Fees | Net value | Net gain | Total % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 year | $100,000 | $120,000 | $5,714 | $114,098 | $14,098 | 14.1% |
| 5 years | $100,000 | $248,832 | $37,845 | $193,366 | $93,366 | 93.4% |
| 10 years | $100,000 | $619,174 | $111,023 | $373,905 | $273,905 | 273.9% |
| 15 years | $100,000 | $1,540,702 | $252,526 | $723,006 | $623,006 | 623.0% |
| 20 years | $100,000 | $3,833,760 | $526,144 | $1,398,050 | $1,298,050 | 1,298.1% |
Shown at $100,000, no monthly additions, 20% gross, so the table and the calculator can be checked against each other. Gross value is what the same balance would be before fees. Fees are management plus performance, summed. All figures nominal — inflation is not deducted.
What would have to be true.
That the edge persists. The replay covers one volatility regime and 12.8 months, and every exit assumes a resting limit that fills when price touches the level. Exit those same signals at the printed close instead and the desk loses $70,717. No projection on this page survives that, which is why the launch plan measures fill rates before it measures returns.
A 29% gross year on a growing balance implies a growing book. Contract count is bounded by option liquidity: past a few dozen contracts per book on SPY and QQQ, the resting limits stop filling and the model's own slippage assumption breaks. A fund that reaches capacity returns capital rather than diluting the rate — the projections here describe the small-capital regime, not an unlimited one.
Read the projection as a range
Same $100,000, no additions, ten years, at each of the three cases:
The spread between the best and worst case is the honest width of the answer. A single-point projection, no matter how carefully modelled, is a marketing number.
A projection that admits its own range is not a pitch, and a desk that publishes one has no reason to oversell. What follows is the structure: a single-member LLC trading its own capital, a $1,500,000 line that turns it into a Delaware LP, and a non-binding indication of interest that costs nothing and commits no one.
$1,500,000 in firm commitments. Not pledges.
The gap between “people are interested” and “the fund exists” is where most small managers get hurt. The structure changes on signed subscriptions with money in escrow — not on a spreadsheet of maybes, and not on a public counter of enthusiasm.
Single-member LLC
No outside capital, no custody, no advisory relationship. The desk trades its own money at one contract per signal. This is the structure until the threshold is crossed.
Delaware LP, LLC as GP
Fund counsel drafts the PPM and LPA. An administrator is appointed, an audit is engaged, and subscriptions are accepted through escrow. Only then does the LLC take outside capital.
Nothing breaks
The desk keeps trading its own capital, and the record keeps accumulating. A manager who needs the fund to survive has an incentive to sell it; this one does not.
A pledge is revocable by definition, so a book of pledges is not capital — it is a list of people who might say yes. Budgeting counsel, audit and administration against a list is how a launch turns into a stalled offering with legal bills attached. The meter above counts only what a bank can see.
A soft commitment is an intention. Nothing more.
It is a way to register that you would want an allocation if a fund is ever formed and if you qualify. It costs nothing, transfers nothing, and can be withdrawn with one email. The acknowledgement below is not a formality: private fund interests can only be offered to verified accredited investors, and only under a memorandum that does not exist yet.
An indication of interest, on the record
A short form saying who you are, how you qualify as an accredited investor, and roughly what size allocation would interest you if the fund launches. It creates no obligation on either side. It is not a subscription, not a reservation, and not a claim on any future interest.
When — and only when — there is a private placement memorandum and a partnership agreement, the same conversation continues with documents that actually mean something.
Not an investment, not a queue position
It does not entitle anyone to an allocation, a price, a fee discount or a priority. It is not transferable. It does not survive as an offer if the structure never launches. And it is not a promise that the desk will still be trading when it does.
If that sounds uncommercial, it is deliberate. A soft commitment that quietly implies a right is a liability dressed as a waiting list.
Before the form
Three statements, all of which have to be true for the form to be useful to either side.
Recorded, there.
You will get exactly one email from us when — and only if — a memorandum exists and there is something real to read. No newsletter, no drip sequence, no “just checking in”.
The file is the per-book summary behind every number on this site: trades, win rate, profit factor, net, drawdown, cash floor and the adverse-fill case. Hypothesis, not history.
What actually happens next.
One email, when there is something to send
Not before. A memorandum, a partnership agreement, a fee schedule and a subscription packet. Everything else is noise until those exist.
Verification, then signature
Accreditation is verified before any subscription is accepted — a letter from counsel, a tax return, or a certification from a registered professional. A DocuSign envelope follows, not precedes, that check.
Escrow, then the fund exists
Funds go to escrow, not to the manager. If the minimum is not reached, subscriptions are returned. The desk never holds investor money before a close.
The ones worth asking.
Is any of this binding?
No. Not the form, not a reply, not a conversation. Only a signed subscription agreement with a fund that has closed is binding, and that is years of paperwork away from this page.
Do you take money now?
No, and there is nowhere on this site to send it. If anyone claiming to be SkyQuant asks for a wire before a memorandum and a signed subscription exist, it is fraud.
What if $1.5M never arrives?
Then the fund is not formed, the desk keeps trading its own capital, and nothing is owed to anyone. That is the intended outcome of a threshold, not a failure of it.
Why not raise a smaller fund?
Because the fixed cost of being a fund — counsel, audit, administration, compliance — does not shrink with the raise. Below roughly $1.5M those costs eat the fee revenue that is supposed to pay for them.
What data do I get today?
The per-book replay summary: 12.8 months, 9,251 trades, net of Tradier fees, with the adverse-fill case shown alongside. It is hypothetical, and it is labelled that way in the file itself.
Can non-accredited investors participate?
Not in this structure. A private fund relying on Rule 506(c) may sell only to verified accredited investors. Registering interest anyway is fine — it just may never convert, and we would rather say so now.
Nothing on this page is an offer to sell or a solicitation of an offer to buy any security. Any offering would be made only by a private placement memorandum to investors who meet the applicable qualifications. All performance figures are hypothetical, produced by replaying historical option prints over 12.8 months, and are not indicative of future results.